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 The word “supranational citizenship” or “UN citizenship” is not yet part of the 
United Nations’ usual vocabulary. The use of the “citizenship” concept in UN discourse 
is quasi-exclusively limited to the national context, a definition of citizenship bounded by 
state borders (Delcourt, 2006: 187). Must we therefore conclude that the UN is not 
“making citizenship” at all? Given that the notions of “supranational” or “UN 
citizenship” are absent from the United Nations’ official discourse, the answer seems 
obviously to be YES. Yet, consideration of the European experience demonstrates that 
this response may be too hasty.  The example of the EU, and some work on European 
citizenship, suggest another answer to this question. The aim of the present paper is to 
show that, just as the European Union was making citizenship well before the Maastricht 
Treaty mentioned European citizenship, the United Nations system is a supranational 
framework that is beginning to engage a process of citizenisation. 
 
Based on a large and dynamic conception of citizenship, defined as a double 
relation - between citizens and between citizens and a political entity - characterized by 
rights, access to institutions and belonging to a community (Jenson and Phillips, 1996; 
Wiener 1998; Bellamy, 2005; Auvachez, 2006), this paper proceeds in two steps. First, it 
demonstrates how the European experience provides a significant precedent to deal with 
the issue of citizenisation in a supranational context, both empirically and theoretically. 
Then, it sheds light on the emergence of elements of a UN citizenship regime often 
neglected by mainstream theories of supranational citizenship.  
 
 
Lessons from the European experience 
Raising the question – what does the EU experience suggest? 
 
The contemporary literature on the issue of supranational citizenship is dominated 
by a major concern: the locus of citizenship (Auvachez, 2006: 53), asserting it to be 
either national or supranational. Pleading for the progressive “de-nationalization”
1 of 
citizenship, the advocates of supranational citizenship often consider it in opposition to 
national citizenship, confining the debates to an endless circularity. Whether taking a 
legal perspective (works on international human rights regime, such as those of Yasemin 
Soysal and Rainer Bauböck for example), a global civil society point of view (Warren 
Magnusson, Michael Walzer, Richard Falk, Eunice Sahle) or a cosmopolitan solidarity 
perspective (Martha Nussbaum, Andrew Linklater), most of the recent work on 
supranational citizenship seeks to demonstrate that citizenship is, or should be, more and 
more supranational, and consequently less and less national. “Increasingly therefore 
normative debate is polarized between liberal nationalists and cosmopolitans. 
Cosmopolitans seek to understand the scope for rights, participation and belonging 
beyond the nation-state, whereas liberal nationalists defend the national model” 
(Tambini, 2001: 202). Such a polarization of the debates relies on the exclusive 
conception of citizenship that guides the arguments.  It is not a very productive debate.   
 
                                                 
1 The expression is borrowed from Linda Bosniak (2000) 
  1A focus on the European case can provide a fruitful clue to go beyond the endless 
debate characterizing the recent literature about supranational citizenship. A significant 
number of theorists of European integration and European citizenship have been critical 
of this polarized perspective for many years and have long sought to move beyond it. In 
1995, Maurice Roche, although quite critical regarding the development of European 
citizenship from a social inclusion perspective, stated: “The simple counterposing of the 
universal to the national is not likely to be as helpful for contemporary social research 
and analysis in this field as is attempting to grasp the ways in which the world of nation-
states and their institutions is beginning, on the one hand, to generate an important 
transnational sphere and also, on the other hand, to give ground (legitimacy, aspects of 
sovereignty, etc.) to the world-regional and global regulatory and institution-building 
processes at work and accumulating in this sphere” (Roche, 1995: 727).  
 
Rather than opposing the national and the supranational, a significant body of 
literature on the Union seeks to contextually grasp the institutional frameworks that 
organize citizenship and citizenship practices
2. Rather than seeking to determine which 
locus expresses citizenship the best, it considers them as complementary and proposes to 
understand their articulation.  
In an identity-focused perspective
3, Martin Kohli proposed the concept of 
“hybridity” to understand the articulation between European and national identities“. 
Accordingly, European identity is not empirically opposed to national identity. It can and 
should be conceived as multi-level or multilayered, comprising global and national (and 
possibly regional and local attachments as well” (2000: 126). “European identity may be 
part of an identity mix linking it with national (and possibly other territorial) identities; or 
it may be part of a specifically hybrid pattern where contradictions remain virulent and 
situational switches occur” (2000: 131).  
As early as 1993, Elizabeth Meehan proposed the notion of a “multiple 
citizenship” which considers national and European citizenships as complementary rather 
than exclusive: “My thesis is not that [Raymond] Aron’s concept of national citizenship 
is being relocated to a new level. It is that a new kind of citizenship is emerging that is 
neither national nor cosmopolitan but that is multiple in the sense that the identities, 
rights and obligations, … are expressed through an increasing complex configuration of 
common Community institutions, states, national and transnational voluntary 
associations, regions and alliances of regions (…) What is certain is that the European 
Community now provides a framework that coexists with those of its Member States, 
through which nationals of those Member States can claim certain rights” (Meehan, 
1993: 1; 2).  
 
 
                                                 
2 It has to be mentioned that the literature on European citizenship can be divided into 2 main camps:  those 
who doubt about the existence of an effective European citizenship and try to elaborate principles or 
scenarios that could make it possible (works of Weiler, Lehning or Føllesdal for example), and those who 
acknowledge the existence of European citizenship and seek to understand its practices. The analysis 
proposed in this paper principally refers to the latter.  
3 As the definition of citizenship mentioned in the introduction encompasses the belonging to a community, 
works on European identity can be helpful to grasp the issue of European citizenship.  
  2Despite the absence of the term “European citizenship” in the European 
Community’s institutional discourse prior to the Maastricht Treaty (1993), scholars now 
find signs of the construction of a European citizenship from the first years of the 
European construction. “As a policy, citizenship remained largely invisible until 
citizenship of the Union was spelled out and legally grounded in the 1993 Treaty of the 
Union. Nevertheless, the roots of citizenship policy and actual citizenship practice can be 
traced over a period of about two decades” (Wiener, 1998: 41).  These practices had other 
names than citizenship, called for example education, culture, electoral policies, passport, 
movement, establishment, and so on. Yet, they “can be identified and put together in the 
same way one works on a jigsaw puzzle” (Wiener, 1998: 10).  
In a more recent study, Willem Maas traces back the origins of European 
citizenship to the 1950s, and he says: “The origins of the rights of EU citizenship are to 
be found in the initial negotiations and treaties that established the foundations of 
European integration” (Maas, 2007: 13). Similarly, Isabelle Petit has shown that the 
European Community started to develop a European education policy to create a Euro-
identity among citizens since the early years of the European integration. (Petit, 2005: 
668-669). The idea that the origins of European citizenship are well anterior to its 
formalisation in the institutional discourse through the Maastricht Treaty is now widely 
acknowledged among Europeanist who seek to grasp European citizenship practices (see 
Shaw, 1998; Ferrera, 2005; Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw, 2006 for example).  
The European precedent demonstrates that citizenship-building initiatives can be 
undertaken by a political entity even if its institutional discourse or legal framework does 
not explicitly use the word.  The European experience thus justifies examining the United 
Nations. The absence of any citizenship vocabulary in the UN discourse is not an 
indicator of the absence of any citizenship practices in the UN framework: it does not 
follow from the absence of words such as “supranational citizenship” or “UN citizenship” 
in the United Nations’ institutional discourse that the UN is not “making citizenship”.  It 
remains an empirical question that needs to be further explored.                                               
 
 
Theoretical lessons from the EU experience 
  
Theories developed to analyse European citizenship also provide useful analytical 
tools to think about the possibility of citizenship building in the UN institutional context. 
Three theoretical lessons can be drawn from the EU experience: they concern the scope 
of citizenship, the link between citizenship and institution-building and the need to 
consider citizenship-building as a dynamic process.  
 
The emergence of citizenship in a supranational entity such as the European 
Union has challenged the common understandings of citizenship and raised numerous 
debates about the scope of the concept (Schmitter, 1996; Shaw, 1998; Bellamy and 
Warleigh, 2001). “If such a political entity, which is best defined as a polity in-the-
making offers citizenship rights despite the fact that a national state is not the final goal, 
then the questions at hand are What does union citizenship entail? How have union 
citizenship rights been established?” (Wiener, 1998: 5). As early as 1997, through her 
reconstruction of the “interrelated stories of citizenship policy and institution-building” 
  3(1998: 14) in the European case, Antje Wiener pleaded for an enlarged understanding of 
citizenship: through the idea of “citizenship practice”, she insisted on the necessity to 
move beyond the issue of rights and formal criteria to take into account informal criteria, 
intangible aspects of citizenship (1998: 23). This enlarged conception of citizenship has 
been retained by several authors since then (see for example Shaw, 1998; Bellamy, 2005; 
Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw, 2006).  
The “citizenship regime” developed by Jane Jenson and Susan Phillips in the 
Canadian context (1996) and applied by Jane Jenson to the European case (for example 
Jenson, 2007) provides an interesting analytical tool that corresponds to this enlarged 
conception of citizenship. Indeed, it considers citizenship through four dimensions 
(Jenson, 2007: 55-56): 
- Citizenship establishes the conditions for belonging to a political community, in 
both the narrow sense of nationality and the larger notion of identity, thereby contributing 
to its definition;  
- A citizenship regime then entails rights and duties, the recognition of which may 
also contribute to establish the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion of a political 
community;  
- It also prescribes a specific responsibility mix that allocates the various 
citizenship-related responsibilities to different institutional actors
4.  
- Finally, a citizenship regime specifies the democratic rules of the game for a 
political entity, i.e. the mechanisms giving access  to the institutions, the modes of 
participation in civic life and public debates, and the legitimacy of specific types of 
claims making. 
 
Studies on EU citizenship have then contributed to shed light on the mutually 
constitutive relationship between citizenship and institution-building; in that perspective, 
they made use of the works in historical sociology that have documented the place of 
citizenship in the formation and the consolidation of the institutions of the nation state 
and the link between citizenship and institutional design (Bendix, 1964; Tilly, 1990; 
Brubaker, 1992). “Understood in a socio-historical sense the process of institution 
building means making routine practices, norms, rules and procedures which contribute 
to establish a distinguishable practice of citizenship” (Wiener, 1998: 9). In a similar 
perspective, Jo Shaw pleads for “a recognition of citizenship as an integral part of the EU 
polity understood as a dynamic governance structure” (1998: 316). The construction of 
citizenship is thus always open to new, “nonpredetermined” developments (Balibar, 
2004). Both constitutive of and constituted by the process of institution-building, 
citizenship presents a dynamic nature: as institutions are evolving, citizenship is given a 
different content. The changing conceptions that have been guiding the construction of 
European institutions have altered the citizenship model promoted by the EU, thereby 
attesting the dynamic character of EU citizenship (see notably Auvachez, forthcoming).  
                                                 
4 This dimension of the citizenship regime was not present in the original concept proposed by Jane Jenson 
and Susan Phillips in 1996; it was added later on by Jane Jenson. The conception of the responsibility mix 
proposed here is larger than the one proposed by Jane Jenson; indeed, it goes further the social citizenship 
perspective adopted by Jenson (which leads her to consider the responsibility mix through a “welfare 
diamond” composed of the state, the market, the collectivity and the market) to include other actors such as 
regional and local collectivities, supranational entities, etc.   
  4 
Finally, the European experience has led several Europeanist scholars to recall 
that citizenship is a dynamic construction, the building of which is a continuing process 
(Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw, 2006; Maas, 2007). Individuals are not automatically 
citizens; they become citizens through one or several processes of creation of citizenship: 
“(…) questions of citizenship can only be posed in terms of process and access. We are 
not ‘citizens,’ but we can ‘become citizens’ ” (Balibar, 2004: 199). It is through a process 
of creation of citizenship, i.e. a “citizenisation” process (Tully, 2001 and 2002), that 
individuals acquire citizenship; the citizenisation process corresponds to the progressive 
building of a relationship between citizens and the political entity considered, and among 
citizens themselves, characterized by rights, access to institutions and belonging to a 




Is the UN engaged in a citizenisation process? 
 
The European experience, and the lessons which can be drawn from it in terms of 
scope and definition of citizenship, demonstrate that citizenship does not limit itself to the 
establishment of a legal status, although this element has to be taken into consideration; it 
takes form through various political initiatives and institutional innovations. The analysis 
of the emergence of elements of citizenship in the United Nations’ system should 
therefore not be confined to the issue of international rights; the demonstration has to go 
beyond the usual analyses focusing only on the establishment of an international human 
rights regime as the cornerstone of a supranational citizenship (for example, Berkovitch, 
1999; Soysal, 1994; Bauböck, 1993; Parry, 1991) to take into account other dimensions 
of citizenship, such as the access to institutions, the definition of belonging and the 
responsibility mix inherent to citizenship. 
Then, the emergence of elements of citizenship in the UN framework has to be 
seen from a “citizenisation process” perspective, which considers the building of 
citizenship as a continuing process closely linked to the process of institution-building in 
the UN system. Thus, considering citizenisation and institution-building as two 
interrelated dynamic processes, the analysis takes into account the political development 
and institutional innovations affecting the UN system since its creation.  
 
The question at hand is how the political developments and institutional 
innovations that have affected the UN system since its creation have contributed to the 
emergence of elements of a specific UN citizenship regime?  From a perspective seeking 
to link citizenisation and institution-building, it seems that several institution-building 
issues, which have been of major concern within the UN arena during the last years, 
deserve to be analyzed. Whether in terms of decision-making or norms-enforcement, the 
UN institutional design has raised many debates since the construction of the 
Organization in 1945.  
 
Citizenship encompasses three parts: a civil part, a political part and a social part 
(Marshall, 1963: 73-74). And each element is associated with specific institutions: courts 
  5of justice, parliaments or decision-making institutions, the educational system and social 
services (Marshall, 1963: 74; Janoski and Gran, 2002: 16).  
The active contribution of the court to the construction of citizenship has been 
clearly demonstrated in the European context. Political scientists as well as jurists have 
shown how the European Court of Justice’s activities have contributed to the building of 
the Union citizenship (Shaw, 1998; Shaw and Fries, 1998; Toner, 2000; Maltese, 2004; 
Mather, 2005). Jo Shaw demonstrates that behind the Maastricht Treaty and the 
formalization of EU citizenship, “(…) there lay, in truth, a developing ‘practice’ of 
citizenship policy, extending over a period of twenty years, which was to be found 
principally in the activities of the Court of Justice and the European Commission. This 
has seen a gradual solidification of the resources of citizenship from ‘mere’ ideas into 
concrete policy outcomes withy legal force” (Shaw, 1998: 299).  
Although foundational, because underlying other citizenship elements (Janoski 
and Gran, 2002: 15), the civil part of citizenship is quasi-ignored by theories about 
supranational citizenship. Except in Europeanists’ works, the access to justice at a 
supranational level and the emergence of supranational courts are often neglected by 
mainstream theories about citizenship beyond the state. However, in a citizenisation 
perspective that seeks to link institution-building processes and construction of 
citizenship, the building of supranational criminal institutions in the United Nations 
context has to be taken into consideration. 
 
 
The building of supranational criminal institutions 
 
  The exponential growth of an international human rights regime is often 
considered as the cornerstone of the emergence of a supranational citizenship 
(Berkovitch, 1999; Soysal, 1994; Bauböck, 1993; Parry, 1991). Yet, another facet of 
international law, fully studied by jurists but quasi-ignored by political scientists, and 
particularly those working on supranational citizenship
5, provides significant insights 
about citizenship-building in the UN context: the building of supranational criminal 
jurisdictions.  
Elements of context: the emergence of supranational criminal jurisdictions 
Since the end of the Second World War and the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, 
efforts have been made at the UN, and particularly within its International Law 
Commission, to draft a comprehensive international criminal code (Neff, 1999: 116; 
Greppi, 1999). This substantive-law effort has been complemented by several institution-
building initiatives aiming at establishing supranational courts to conduct actual trials.  
As early as in 1948, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (resolution 260 of 
9 December 1948), called for acts of genocide to be tried “by such international penal 
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall 
have accepted its jurisdiction” (Article 6). In the same resolution, the General Assembly 
invited the International Law Commission, a United Nations General assembly body, to 
                                                 
5 A few exceptions can be mentioned , such as  Stephen Neff (1999: 105-120) 
  6study the possibility of establishing a permanent International Criminal Court. Following 
the Commission's conclusion that the establishment of an international court to try 
persons charged with genocide or other crimes of similar gravity was both desirable and 
possible, the General Assembly established a committee to prepare proposals relating to 
the establishment of such a court. The committee prepared a draft statute in 1951 and a 
revised draft statute in 1953. The prevailing international political climate during the 
1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s, however, obliged the General Assembly to postpone 
consideration of the draft statute.  
Since that time, the question of the establishment of a supranational criminal court 
has been reconsidered periodically within the UN. In December 1989, in response to a 
request by Trinidad and Tobago, the General Assembly asked the International Law 
Commission to resume work on an international criminal court with jurisdiction to 
include drug trafficking. Then the eruption of ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
and the war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed in those contexts, 
once again drew international attention; the UN Security Council established two ad hoc 
ad hoc War Crimes Tribunals: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (1993) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994).  
Shortly thereafter, the International Law Commission successfully completed its 
work on the draft statute for an international criminal court and in 1994 submitted the 
draft statute to the General Assembly. To consider major substantive issues arising from 
that draft statute, the General Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, which met twice in 1995. After the 
General Assembly had considered the Committee's report, it created the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court to prepare a widely 
acceptable consolidated draft text for submission to a diplomatic conference. The 
Preparatory Committee, which met from 1996 to 1998, held its final session in March and 
April of 1998 and completed the drafting of the text. This consolidated text served as a 
basis for the discussion the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
held in Rome from 15 June to 17 July 1998, that led to the adoption of the Rome statute 
creating the first International Criminal Court
6.  
 
The construction of supranational criminal institutions by the UN: indicators of change 
 
As described above, from the first Drafts proposed by the ILC to the creation of 
the International Criminal Court, passing by the two had hoc Criminal Tribunals, the 
progressive building of supranational criminal jurisdictions comprised several steps. 
Some directions of change can be discerned in the institution-building process; they can 
be grasped through 3 major questions: Where?, Who?, And how?. 
 
 
                                                 
6 As this paper focuses on the process of citizenisation in the UN institutional framework and as the ICC , 
although it has strong relations with the UN, is not formally a UN organ but an independent treaty-based  
international organization, the following analysis is based on the provisions of the ICC Statute that derive 
form  the UNO’s works (which represents most of the provisions); such provisions are notably contained in 
the draft statute proposed by the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court created by the UN General Assembly. 
  7Where: where is the international criminal law enforced? 
  As described above, the idea of an individual criminal responsibility has been in 
existence for a long time within the United Nations. But actual courts to enforce criminal 
international law have only come into existence recently.  
In the absence of such courts, the enforcement of the international criminal law 
(which covers the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime 
of aggression) has traditionally been the responsibility of the states only, in the name of 
their universal jurisdiction: “Universal jurisdiction is the principle that certain crimes are 
so heinous, and so universally recognized and abhorred, that a state is entitled or even 
obliged to undertake legal proceedings without regards to where the crime was omitted or 
the nationality of the perpetrator or the victims” (Macedo, 2006: 4).  
It is in the name of this universal jurisdiction, and following the fact that most 
states failed to give their courts such jurisdiction under national law, that the UN Security 
Counsil has created the ad hoc Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda 
(1994). For the first time since the Nuremberg and Tokyo post-war trials, actual 
international – and not national – tribunals are established for the prosecution of 
individuals responsible for acts committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.   
With the creation of such organs, the responsibility for arraigning individuals does not 
rely on States only; subsidiary organs of the United Nations have now the power to do so.   
This power has however some limits. First, the jurisdiction of the two ad hoc 
tribunals is circumscribed both ratione loci and ratione temporis, i.e. geographically and 
temporally. According to its statute, the jurisdiction of the ICTY is restricted to crimes 
committed on the territory of former Yugoslavia since 1991 (article 1). And the ICTR 
“shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States 
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994” (article 1 of the ICTR statute). Then, 
the two international criminal tribunals are, by definition, temporary: “(…) ad hoc 
tribunals are limited to particular situations and once their work is done they are 
disbanded” (Harris, 1998: 1).  
The works of the UN General Assembly (especially its International Law and then 
the preparatory committees established by the UN GA) for the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court mark a step further in this institution-building process. The 
draft statute presented by the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court on the basis of the ILC’s text proposes the creation of a both 
permanent and universal
7 international criminal court : “While the Tribunals are intended 
to deliver justice for crimes of a particular time and place in the aftermath of the tragedy, 
the permanent ICC is aimed to strengthen and expand the enforcement of International 
Humanitarian Law based on prior consent of its Member states, to act as an independent, 
impartial and effective court with jurisdiction over crimes committed after the entry into 
force of its Statute” (Mirceva, 2004: 3).  For Patrick Daillier and Alain Pellet, the creation 
of the ICC assures a more systematic jurisdictional guaranty (2002: 726).   
 
 
Who: who can be prosecuted? 
                                                 
7 This element is further developed in the next section. 
  8The State has for long been an “opaque screen” between the individual and the  
international legal order: the existence of the individual on the international legal scene 
was hidden behind the state screen (Daillier and Pellet, 2002: 649). The individual 
responsibility (of the national leaders for example) was confused with the state 
responsibility that could be contested in front of the International Court of Justice or other 
regional courts (such as the European Court of Human Rights or the Inter-American 
Court) (see the example given by David Harris, in Harris, 1998: 1). With the building of 
supranational criminal jurisdictions, one can observe the progressive dissociation of the 
personality of the state and of the individual. The individual acquires a judicial capacity 
no longer confused with the judicial capacity of its state of nationality. The progressive 
building of supranational criminal jurisdictions means the concretization of the “direct” 
or monist approach that treats all individuals as being directly subject to a single body of 
laws (Neff, 1999: 116)
8.   
Although the international criminal law developed in the UN institutional context 
formally applies to each UN member states’ citizen, it is only recently that the 
supranational criminal justice has made a step towards universal application. Indeed, in 
the absence of an effective exercise of their universal jurisdiction by the states and with 
ad hoc criminal tribunals temporally and geographically limited in their jurisdiction, 
international criminal justice could hardly been said to address to all individuals, even 
formally. The provisions contained in the draft statute transmitted by the UN preparatory 
committee and adopted by the UN diplomatic conference at Rome indicate a change 
towards a more universal criminal justice. Pursuant to article 12 of the ICC statute (art. 7, 
option 2 of the Draft statute of the Preparatory Committee), in the case of a situation 
deferred to the Prosecutor by a State Party or an investigation initiated by the Prosecutor, 
an individual can be tried by the Court if the state of which he is a national or the state on 
the territory of which he committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the court is party to 
the ICC Statute or has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. Those preconditions are 
often referred to by the detractors of the ICC to justify their scepticism about its 
efficiency (considering in particular the US refusal to adopt the Statute); but it is seldom 
mentioned that these two preconditions are alternative, and not cumulative:  “(…)The 
court will have jurisdiction over nationals of non-states parties when the state on whose 
territory the alleged atrocities have taken place is party to the Statute” (van Alebeek, 
2000: 488). Each citizen thus becomes potentially prosecutable. This is reinforced by the 
fact that the preconditions to the exercise of the jurisdictions of the Court do not apply for 
the situations deferred to the Prosecutor by the UN Security Council: “Namely, if a 
matter that is referred to the ICC by the SC concerns not States parties and they have not 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, it is possible for the ICC to fully exercise it is 
possible for the ICC to fully exercise its jurisdiction” (Mirceva, 2004: 5).  In the case of a 
situation deferred by the UN Security Council, any citizen can thus be arraigned in front 
of the ICC, without regards to his nationality. 
 
                                                 
8 Such an evolution should not be misinterpreted, as it is often the case. It doesn’t follow from the 
emergence of an international individual criminal responsibility that the legal existence of the individual on 
the supranational scene is completely disconnected from the state and that the link of nationality is not 
relevant anymore; as mentioned above and as demonstrated by the European experience, it is in terms of 
complementarity or articulation that the question must be raised (cf. below).  
  9How: how can prosecutions be engaged? 
The prosecution of international crimes has traditionally been a state monopoly. 
As mentioned above, in the absence of international jurisdictions, the prosecutions of the 
crimes defined in international law relied on the will of the states; only states had the 
possibility to initiate investigations and pursuits against individuals.  
In that context, the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals distinguish 
themselves, with the creation of a Prosecutor with investigatory power: “(…) the Statutes 
of the two ad hoc Tribunals very simple and clearly gave the Prosecutor a power to 
decide to initiate investigation” (Mirceva, 2004: 4). The creation of the two ICT thus 
means the emergence of a new mechanism to initiate investigations against individuals 
with the establishment of a new actor in the institutional system of supranational criminal 
justice: the Prosecutor. The power of this new actor has however some limitations: as the 
UN Security Council has established the two ad hoc tribunals and defined their mandates, 
the ad hoc Tribunals’ prosecutor is confined to initiate investigations only in the 
framework of the situations referred by the Security Council’s Resolutions.  
The position of the Prosecutor has been conserved in the works of the UN for the 
establishment of the ICC, and in the final Rome statute. Indeed, the investigation under 
ICC jurisdiction can be triggered by three different mechanisms:  by referral from States, 
by reference to the Prosecutor by the UN Security Council
9, and by proprio motu 
decision of the Prosecutor. For several scholars, the last option – an independent 
prosecutorial initiation of the investigation of investigation –, albeit carefully 
circumscribed by the necessity for the Prosecutor to obtain an authorization of the Pre-
Trial Chamber to conduct further investigation - is one of the most significant 
achievement of the ICC Statute : the possibility for the Prosecutor to decide to initiate 
investigation on the basis of communications received from various source (such as 
organs of the United Nations, NGOs, or individual persons for example) confirms the 
obsolescence of the state monopoly on supranational criminal justice (Daillier and Pellet, 
2002: 726; Mirceva, 2004: 4).  
 
 
Deciphering the building of supranational criminal institutions from a citizenisation 
perspective 
 
Having described the emergence of supranational criminal jurisdictions and 
grasped the dynamics of change underpinning this institution-building process, the aim of 
the present section is to explore the link between institution-building and citizenisation; it 
thus seeks to decipher the building process of supranational criminal institutions from a 
citizenisation perspective to shed light on the emergence of elements of citizenship in the 
UN institutional framework. 
 
Rights and duties 
As mentioned above, most of the analyses dealing with the issue of supranational 
citizenship exclusively focus on the issue of rights; they rely on the establishment on an 
international human rights  regime to demonstrate the emergence of a supranational 
citizenship. Analyzing the development of international criminal law sheds light on an 
                                                 
9 Note that the UN Security Council can refer a situation to the Prosecutor, and not individual cases.  
  10emerging element of supranational citizenship largely ignored by political scientists: the 
individual responsibility.  
Founding the argument of a supranational citizenship on the development of 
international rights regimes seems quite incomplete. Rights can hardly be considered in 
isolation from their compensation, duties. “A claim imposes a corresponding duty on 
others to help respect and protect the right” (Janoski and Gran, 2002: 16). Like rights, 
duties and the corresponding notion of responsibility imply a relation: a citizenship 
relation between individuals, and between individuals and a political entity. One’s rights 
confer a certain responsibility to the other; and such responsibility is be enforced by a 
political entity through a judiciary system.  
Through the development by the UN of an international criminal law system and 
the construction of supranational criminal courts designed to prosecute individuals, an 
individual criminal responsibility, distinct from the state responsibility, is emerging. With 
the construction of supranational criminal jurisdictions, citizens are thus hold accountable 
of their acts in the national, but also in the supranational sphere (where they can be 
prosecuted for crime of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity). The rights 
conferred to the individual by the international human rights regime are compensated by 
an emerging responsibility defined in the international criminal law and becoming 
effective with the building of international criminal jurisdictions.  
Moreover, the emergence of this individual responsibility sheds a new light on the 
issue of rights in the supranational sphere. The building by the UN of criminal 
jurisdiction is accompanied by the emergence of new rights, essentially civil rights of 
procedural nature. Among citizenship-rights are the rights that support or facilitate access 
to justice (Marshall, 1963: 74; Janoski and Gran, 2002: 229). The ICTY and the ICTR 
statutes, as well as the ICC statute (on the basis of the Draft statute written by the UN 
Preparatory Committee), contain provisions about the rights of the victims and the rights 
of the accused.  Indeed, all 3 texts specify that the court shall take appropriate measures 
to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of 
victims (and witnesses) (art. 22 of the ICTY Statute, art. 21 of the ICTR Statute and art. 
68 of the ICC Statute).The ICC statute, following the propositions of the UN Preparatory 
Committee, goes even further concerning the rights of the victims. For the first time in 
the history of international criminal justice, victims are conferred upon rights to 
participate in proceedings and to request reparations. Pursuant to article 68 of the ICC 
statute (art. 68 of the Draft statute presented by the UN Preparatory Committee), the 
Court shall permit the views and concerns of the victims to be presented during the 
proceedings, where the personal interests of the victims are affected. Moreover, 
according to article 75 of the ICC Statute, (art. 73 of the Draft Statute), “victims can 
request reparations for harm they have suffered as the result of a crime within the Court’s 
jurisdiction. The Court may also decide to deal with reparations on its own initiative, 
even where victims have not submitted applications” (ICC, 2005: 2).   
The creation of supranational criminal jurisdictions also means the definition of 
procedural rights for the accused. The ICTY, ICTR and ICC statutes all present a detailed 
list of the rights that any accused person shall enjoy, including the presumption of 
innocence, the right to a fair hearing conducted impartially, to be tried without undue 
delay, to be informed promptly and in detail of the charge, to have adequate time and 
facilities for the preparation of the defence, to have legal assistance without payment if 
  11the accused lacks sufficient means to pay for such assistance, to present evidence (ICC 
Statute), and the right to have charges proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  
With the building of supranational criminal jurisdictions, individuals, whether as 





  With the emergence of supranational criminal jurisdictions, citizens are given 
access to supranational justice. Supranational justice ceases to be an exclusively inter-
state affair. Such an access relies on several mechanisms. First, individual citizens can 
testify before the courts if called as witnesses; furthermore, as mentioned before 
concerning the ICC, where their personal interest are affected, victims can present their 
views and concerns before the Court during the proceedings and request financial 
reparation.  
Most importantly, the emergence of a new actor in supranational justice in the 
figure of the Prosecutor gives citizens a new mode of access to judicial institutions.   
Pursuant to the provision concerning the Prosecutor proposed in article 18 of the ICTY 
Statute, article 17 of the ICTR Statute and article 15 of the Rome Statute (article 12 of the 
UN Draft Statute), individuals or organizations may submit to the Prosecutor information 
on crimes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The Prosecutor shall assess the 
information received and decide whether there is sufficient basis to proceed. Citizens can 
thus contribute to the Prosecutor’s investigation. In the case of the ICTY and ICTR, this 
contribution is yet circumscribed : the ad hoc Tribunals’ Prosecutor is confined to initiate 
investigation only in the framework of the situations defined by the UN Security 
Council’s resolutions (i.e. geographically and temporally limited situations). Citizens can 
submit information concerning those situations only. Such a limitation does not exist in 
the ICC framework, making the citizens’ access to the Prosecutor’s Office even more 
important to consider. Through non-governmental organizations or by themselves, 
citizens can send information to the Prosecutor asking him to initiate an investigation. On 
the basis of these “communications”, the Prosecutor may decide to initiate investigations 
(after an authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber). Citizens can thus not only 
participate in the proceedings, they can also contribute to trigger an investigation. 
 
Belonging 
Through the building of supranational criminal institutions, the United Nations 
Organization has concretized the rights and duties formally defined in international 
criminal law
10 and given citizens a new access to supranational institutions. Through this 
process, it has thus contributed to the building of a relationship of a certain kind between 
individuals and between supranational institutions and individuals.  
Detractors of the emergence of a supranational citizenship often base their 
argument on the idea that citizenship entails inclusion and exclusion and thus cannot be 
conceived in isolation from the nation-states borders. The building of supranational 
criminal jurisdictions under the UN impulse provides a fruitful example of how borders 
                                                 
10 As mentioned above, although the international criminal law has a long history in the UN system, its 
enforcement has been concretized with the creation of international criminal institutions.  
  12and boundaries, as dynamic constructions, can emerge in the building of a supranational 
citizenship. 
  Such a question can be grasped through the immunity issue and can be analyzed 
along two axes: a functional axis (immunity derived from the function) and a 
geographical one (immunity derived from the nationality).   
The principle of immunity has been strongly affirmed in the different steps of the 
building of supranational criminal jurisdictions - it can even been traced back to the 
judgment of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg (Jescheck, 2004 : 44). 
Pursuant to article 7 (2) of the ICTY Statute and article 6(2) of the ICTR Statute, “the 
official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a 
responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility 
nor mitigate punishment”. This principle is reaffirmed in article 27 of the ICC Statute 
(art. 24 of the Draft Statute):  “This Statute shall apply equally to all person without any 
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as Head of State or 
Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a 
government official shall in nor case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under 
this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. 
Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach the official capacity of a person, 
whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its 
jurisdiction over such a person”. According to those dispositions, the building of 
supranational criminal institutions thus implies the obsolescence of the immunities 
traditionally associated with the highest functions of the state in the international legal 
system. The basic idea is that whether officials, civil servants or particulars, the authors 
of a crime of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity should be tried (Daillier 
and Pellet, 2002: 715). No citizen can be excluded from the jurisdiction of the tribunals in 
virtue of his function
11. 
On a functional axis, the building of supranational criminal jurisdictions, and 
particularly of the ICC,  thus relies on a logic of inclusion. The immunity issue has yet to 
be seen along a geographical axis too. As mentioned above, the provisions contained in 
the UN Draft Statute and retained in the ICC Statute make each citizen potentially 
prosecutable, whatever his nationality is. No “national immunity”, i.e. an immunity that 
would derive from one’s nationality, exists in the absolute; no individual is in the 
absolute excluded from the ICC jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it does not follow from that 
that all citizens are equal in front of the ICC jurisdiction and that lines of exclusion 
cannot be discerned. If no citizen enjoys any absolute immunity in virtue of his 
nationality, the link of nationality contributes to draw lines of exclusion in the building of 
a supranational citizenship.  Indeed, depending on their nationality, the probability to be 
judged by the ICC is not the same for states parties’ citizens or citizens whose state has 
accepted the jurisdiction of the court and for non-states parties’ citizens: contrary to the 
former, whose international criminal responsibility applies worldwide, the possibility that 
                                                 
11  Concerning the immunity of the UN agents, the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the 
International Criminal Court and the United Nations, in its article 19, stipulates that: “(…) the United 
Nations undertakes to cooperate fully with the Court and to take all necessary measures to allow the Court 
to exercise its jurisdiction, in particular by waiving any such privileges and immunities”.  
 
  13the latter could be tried by the ICC is  contingent : it is not universal but rather depends 
on the territory where they have committed  crimes.  
Therefore, through the building of supranational criminal jurisdictions by the UN, 
lines of inclusion and exclusion appear in the relationship between individuals and 
individuals and the UN community ; it is in the articulation of the national and 
supranational institutional frameworks that those lines are defined.  
 
Responsibility mix 
The belonging dimension of the citizenship regime and its construction in the 
building of elements of citizenship by the UN sheds light on how the national and 
supranational spheres, far from being opposed, must be considered in complementarity to 
understand the construction of a supranational citizenship today. It is the articulation of 
the national and supranational institutional responsibilities in the citizenship regime 
emerging within the UN  that this section seeks to grasp. 
The first institutional responsibility that can be considered is the responsibility to 
prosecute. Contrary to the two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, whose jurisdiction was primary over national courts, the ICC is 
complementary to national criminal justice systems for the prosecution of the crimes 
defined in international criminal law (Preamble and art. 1 of the Draft Statute proposed 
by the UN Preparatory Committee and the final Rome Statute). The Court exercises its 
jurisdiction when a State is not willing or not able to proceed with an effective 
prosecution. Such a provision could easily be interpreted through a prism opposing the 
national and supranational spheres to conclude to the supremacy of national justice, and 
consequently of a national conception of citizenship. It seems however fruitful to 
consider it more globally in a more constructivist perspective. “The complementary role 
of the ICC is intended to actively facilitate a climate that serves to encourage and expand 
the prosecution of international crimes in domestic courts whilst simultaneously 
strengthening national jurisdictions. (…) The ICC has the power to determine the 
competency of the national investigations and court proceedings and where appropriate 
bring a decision in order to achieve its goal of eliminating impunity for international 
criminals” (Mirceva, 2004 : 3) .  
The procedures concerning the arrest or surrender of persons suspected are also 
characterized by an overlapping of supranational and national responsibilities. “The 
Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person (…) to any State on 
the territory of which that person may be found and shall request the cooperation of that 
State in the arrest and surrender of such a person. States Parties shall (…) comply with 
requests for arrest and surrender” (art. 89 of the ICC Statute and art. 87 of the Draft 
Statute). In light of this provision, States can be considered as executors of the Court’s 
decisions.  
Through those two examples, it appears that the responsibility mix of the 
supranational citizenship regime emerging under the UN impulse is guided by a logic 
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The European experience thus provides a fruitful precedent to analyze the United 
Nations’ system through the prism of citizenship. First, the practical experience of the EU 
demonstrates that the question of the emergence of elements of a supranational 
citizenship regime should not necessarily be conceived through a dichotomous 
perspective which opposes national and supranational but can rather be examined through 
a complementary prism which seeks to understand the articulation between the different 
institutional frameworks that organize citizenship. The history of European citizenship 
also reveals that the analyst must not automatically conclude from the absence of word 
“citizenship” in the UN official discourse that the UN is not building citizenship and has 
to consider the issue as an empirical matter.  
Then, the academic literature about European citizenship offers clues to grasp the 
issue of citizenship-building in the UN context. It recalls the close relationship which 
links citizenisation and institution-building as interrelated dynamic processes and thus 
incites to grasp the issue of citizenisation at the UN level in light of the political 
development and institutional innovations that have affected the UN system since its 
creation.  
The building of supranational criminal courts is one of these major innovations. 
The analysis has first shed light on the changes in the construction supranational criminal 
institutions under the UN impulse. It has then deciphered this institution-building process 
in terms of citizenisation through the prim of the citizenship regime.  
Evaluating the possibility of a European citizenship and making a few pragmatic 
proposals to make it possible, J.H.H Weiler noted: “Typically, the human rights apparatus 
does not apply horizontally as among individuals. Rights conceived in this way give to, 
but do not take from, individual citizens (…). The proposal I am suggesting is for the 
Council to target some of these rights, and model them on article 119 by introducing 
legislation which would prohibit certain conduct among individuals (…). In this way, the 
right of the individual against public authority is converted into a duty towards other 
human beings. This would enrich the notion of a human right as part of citizenship” 
(1997: 495-519). The analysis presented in this paper has shown that with the 
concretization of an individual responsibility through the creation of supranational 
criminal institutions, a relationship has been emerging between citizens and supranational 
institutions, and among citizens themselves. A citizenisation process might thus be in 
progress in the United Nations’ system, and the UN may have gone further than the EU 
on some points.  
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